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Lessons from the French Funding Debate
KATHRYN L. MOORE*
The French retirement system, like the American social security system, is facing
long-term funding difficulties. As a result, the French are debating whether to
expand the role of pre-funded retirement plans. The economic arguments
presented in this debate are virtually identical to the economic arguments
presented in the American debate on whether the American social security
system should be partially privatized
The French and American debates, however, diverge once history and ideology
are considered. The French have a history offailed funded pensions in contrast
to the United States where the failure ofprominent underfunded pension led to
the enactment of ERISA. And while individual choice and individual
responsibility are quintessential American values, "solidarity" plays a much
bigger role in the French debate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the American social security system' is funded principally on a
pay-as-you-go basis.2 In light of the long-term funding difficulties the system
faces,3 policymakers and analysts throughout the country are seriously debating
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author would like to thank the participants in the Saint Louis University School of Law Faculty
Workshop for their helpful comments and Amaud d'Yvoire, Nancy Fritz, Carol Paris, Pascal
Petit, and Amy Osbome for their assistance in finding many of the authorities cited in this
Article.
1 In the United States, the term social security typically refers to cash benefits provided by
the United States's Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. By
contrast, in France, the term generally has a much broader meaning and typically refers to
benefits for family, sickness, and work injuries in addition to old-age benefits. See Kathryn L.
Moore, The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Lessons from Recent Reforms of the French
Retirement System, 29 GA. J. INT'L & CoM. L. 441, 443 n.2 (2001) and authorities cited
therein. For purposes of this Article, the term will refer to each country's first tier base regime
(or regimes) providing for old-age benefits.
2 For a discussion of the funding structure of the American social security system, see
Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under the Current Social Security System, 61 U. PITT. L.
REV. 955, 983-85 (2000) and authorities cited therein.
3 The Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability
Insurance Trust Funds predicts that unless corrective action is taken, social security benefits will
exceed dedicated tax revenues by the year 2018, and the social security system will become
insolvent, that is, unable to pay benefits in full, by the year 2042. THE 2003 ANN. REP. OF THE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND DISABILITY INS. TR.
FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No. 108-49, at 2-3 (2003) (referring to the combined OASDI Trust Funds
and using intermediate assumptions), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR03/
tr03.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
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whether, and to what extent, the system should be privatized.4 For this purpose,
privatization refers to proposals that require or permit workers to invest some
portion of their social security contributions in one or more private funds.
Like the American social security system, the French social security system is
funded principally on a pay-as-you-go basis 5 and is facing long-term funding
difficulties. 6 Policymakers and analysts in France, however, are not even
considering proposals to privatize the French social security system. Indeed,
Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin recently reaffirmed that the government's
primary objective was to "save our pay-as-you-go system."'7 Instead, the current
funding debate in France is playing out on an entirely different level. Rather than
debating whether social security, the first tier of the French retirement system,
should be privatized, the country is debating whether, and to what extent, the first
tier should be reduced and supplemented with a third tier, American-style pre-
funded private pension system.8
4 For a discussion of some leading proposals to partially privatize social security, see, for
example, Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effect on
Women, Minorities, andLower-Income Workers, 65 Mo. L. REV. 341, 346-47 (2000).
5 The 1999 social security financing law created a special reserve to help finance the
increases in benefits anticipated to begin in 2005. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
6 For a detailed discussion of the long-term funding difficulties the system faces, see
generally CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, PREMIER RAPPORT DU CONSEIL
D'ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES (2001), available at http://www.cor-retraites.fr/IMG/pdf/doc-
124.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004) [hereinafter CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION]; and for a brief
summary of the Conseil d'orientation's forecasts in English, see OBSERVATOIRE DES
RETRAITES, RETIREMENT PENSIONS: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 22-23 (2003), available at
http://www.observatoire-ret-aites.org/versionanglaise/letters/lorc3eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 4,
2004).
7 M Raffarin: la retraite 6 60 ans n'est pas remise en cause, LE MONDE, Feb. 3, 2003,
available at http://www.lemonde.fr/web/recherche/l,13-0, l-0,0.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2004)
(author's translation); see generally Projet de Loi: portant r~forme des retraites, Expos6 des
Motifs, NOR: SOCX0300057L/B1, available at http://www.retraites.gouv.fr/IMG/retraites_
exposemotifs_1_.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). [hereinafter Expos6 des Motifs] (declaring
that the reforms proposed in April 2003 will assure the permanence of the pay-as-you-go
system).
8 Anne Lavigne, Pension Funds in France: Still a Dead End?, 28 THE GENEVA PAPERS
ON RISK AND INS. 127, 128 (2003) ("Today there is still no consensus on pension funds in
France. The only issue that seems not to be debatable is the willingness to maintain a
PAYG [pay-as-you-go] public scheme for basic and complementary pension schemes.
The debate concerns the introduction of pension funds as a third pillar."). Note also that:
The pension debate, in France, has essentially focused, until recently, upon
ways of financing retirement, with a strong opposition between supporters of
maintaining the quasi exclusivity for pay-as-you-go financing, and supporters of
a progressive introduction of funded pensions, on top of existing PAYG basic
and complementary schemes.
Ronan Mahieu & Didier Blanchet, Estimating Models of Retirement Behavior on French Data,
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Although the American social security system is funded principally on a pay-
as-you-go basis, pre-funded benefits currently play an important role in the
American retirement system. About half of the American workforce participates
in employer-sponsored retirement plans,9 and those plans hold about three trillion
dollars in assets.10 In contrast, France's employer-sponsored pre-funded private
plans currently play a negligible role in the retirement system." 1 French
policymakers and analysts, however, are seriously debating whether the role of
pre-funded private pensions should be expanded.
This Article will discuss the funding debate in France and the lessons that can
be learned from that debate. The Article will begin with a brief description of the
French retirement system and recent reforms made to that system. It will then
describe the principal arguments presented in the funding debate. Finally, it will
conclude with the lessons Americans can learn from this debate.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FRENCH RETIREMENT SYSTEM
The French retirement system may be characterized by three principal
features: (1) it is quite complex, (2) it is funded principally on a pay-as-you-go
basis, and (3) it is rather generous relative to the pension systems in other
countries. 12
in SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS AND RETIREMENT AROUND THE WORLD: MCRO-ESTIMATION
2(Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise eds., 2004).
Of course, these are not the only issues in the debate regarding reform of the French
retirement system. Other significant issues in the debate include the disparity between the
special regimes and the general regime, the propriety of increasing the retirement age in the
general regime, and the proper role and function of the recently created reserve for the general
regime. This Article will not address these issues.
9 See PATRICK J. PURCELL, RETIREMENT SAVINGS AND HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN 2000:
ANALYSIS OF CENSUS BUREAU DATA (2002), available at http://benefitslink.com/articles/
RL30922_update.pdf (last updated Dec. 12. 2002).
10 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN
BULLETIN No. 9: ABSTRACT OF 1996 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS tbl.A5 (Winter 1999-
2000), available at http://www.dol.gov/esba/programs/opr/bulletl996/cover.htm (last visited
Feb. 4, 2004).
11 "According to survey data by INSEE [National Institute for Statistics and Economic
Studies] in 2000, 12 per cent [sic] of French households have voluntary retirement savings
through complementary collective pension schemes." Lavigne, supra note 8, at 132; see also
INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: A NEW CONSENSUS 87 tbl. 5.2 (2001) (showing that
pension assets represent 3% of GNP in France compared to 66% of GNP in the United States);
FRAN4COIS CHARPENTIER, RETRAITES ET FONDS DE PENSION: L'ETAT DE LA QUESTION EN
FRANCE ETA L'ITRANGER 255-56 & tbl.1 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that in 1995, the first two tiers
of the French retirement system paid about 900 billion francs in benefits compared to the third
tier of the French retirement system which only collected about 10 billion francs in
contributions).
12 Lavigne, supra note 8, at 128; Didier Blanchet & Florence Legros, France: The
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Source adapted from: OBSERVATOIRE DES RERArrES, RETIREMENT PENSIONS: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 4
(Special Edition No. 3 Jan. 2003).
Difficult Path to Consensual Reforms, in SOCIAL SECURITY PENSION REFORM IN EUROPE 109,
111 (Martin Feldstein & Horst Siebert eds., 2002).
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The complexity of the French retirement system arises principally from the
fact that it is organized along occupational lines. 13 As the diagram on the previos
page illustrates, there are four basic occupational categories: (1) farm sector
employees, (2) private sector employees, (3) employees of the public and
parapublic sectors, and (4) the self-employed. Of these categories, private sector
employees are by far the most significant, and represent about two-thirds of the
working population.14 Public and parapublic sector employees, representing
about 20% of the working population, are the next most significant, with the self-
employed representing about 12% of the working population, and farm workers
representing about 3% of the working population. 15
As the diagram on the previous page further illustrates, retirement income
within these occupational categories is typically provided by a three tier system.
The three tiers consist of (1) mandatory base regimes, (2) mandatory
supplementary plans, 16 and (3) optional supplementary occupational plans. The
mandatory base regimes are similar to the American social security system. They
typically use a defined benefit formula to calculate benefits, and the formula bases
benefits, in part, on participants' earnings. The specific benefit formula varies
between mandatory regimes, 17 with the special regimes for public and parapublic
employees typically providing the highest level of benefits, the regimes for the
self-employed typically paying the lowest level of benefits, and the general
regime for private sector employees typically paying a level of benefit that falls
somewhere in the middle. 18
The second tier of the French Social Security, mandatory complementary
13 CONSEIL D'ORIENTAnON, supra note 6, at 51.
14 Cf Conseil d'orientation des retraites, 3 Lettre pour le dibat sur les retraites: les
retraites en France 1 (Oct. 2002) (noting that the general regime covers the majority of private
sector employees and includes 15 million participants, or two-thirds of the working population).
15 See Moore, supra note 1, at 450 and authorities cited therein. Technically, these figures
may slightly overstate the number of private sector employees and understate the number of
employees in the public and parapublic sector. This is because the figures are based on
coverage by the various first tier regimes, discussed below, and because some public sector
employees, specifically contract employees of the public and parapublic sector, are covered by
the general regime and not a special regime. Nevertheless, the figures are adequate for purposes
of a general overview of the French retirement system.
16 Because they are mandatory and funded principally on a pay-as-you-go basis, the
mandatory complementary regimes are sometimes, such as for purposes of European Union
law, viewed as forming a second stage of the first tier of the French retirement system. See
OBSERVATOIRE DES RETRAITES, supra note 6, at 5; see also Moore, supra note 1, at 448 n.27
and authorities cited therein.
17 For a description of the benefit formula for each of the most significant base regimes,
see PIERRE-ALAiN GREC1ANO, LES RETRAITES EN FRANCE: QUEL AVENIR? 31-51 (2002).
18 See Moore, supra note 1, at 456 and authorities cited therein; see also Blanchet &
Legros, supra note 12, at 111-13.
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regimes, is unique to France and has no counterpart in the United States. 19 Most
of these regimes are pay-as-you-go systems that use a point system to distribute
benefits.,: Throughout their working lives, participants accumulate points in
proportion to their contributions. Their pension benefits are then based on their
total accumulated points multiplied by the value of a point, which is fixed each
year.20 Not all occupational categories participate in a mandatory complementary
regime. Of particular significance, salaried employees of the public and
parapublic sector almost never participate in mandatory complementary
regimes. 21 Instead, the special regimes (the mandatory base regimes for public
and parapublic sector employees) typically provide such generous benefits that
the special regime benefits are about equal to or may even exceed the combined
benefits that private sector employees receive from the general regime (the base
regime for private sector employees) and ARRCO and AGIRC (the mandatory
complementary regimes for private sector employees). 22
The third tier of the French retirement system consists of optional
supplementary occupational plans. Like American employer-sponsored pension
plans, optional supplementary occupational plans are usually pre-funded, receive
favorable tax treatment, and are offered by individual employers.23 These plans,
however, play a much smaller role in the French retirement system than do
employer-sponsored pensions in the United States.24
As noted above, the second principal feature of the French retirement system
is that it is funded principally on a pay-as-you-go basis; current contributions are
used to fund current benefits. The first two tiers of the French retirement
system-the mandatory base regimes and the mandatory complementary
regimes-are funded principally on a pay-as-you-go basis. Although reserves are
19 The Netherlands and Sweden also have long histories of collectively bargained regimes
which complement the base regimes. Unlike the French complementary retirement regimes,
however, those of the Netherlands and Sweden have substantial reserves. Jacques-Andr6
Schneider, Supplementary Pension Plans and Collectively Agreed Schemes, in PENSIONS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: ADAPTING TO EcoNoMic AND SOCIAL CHANGE 173, 174-75 (Gerard
Hughes & Jim Stewart eds., 2000).
20 For a more detailed description of ARRCO and AGIRC, the two principal mandatory
complementary regimes, see Moore, supra note 1, at 459-67; and for a more detailed
description of the second tier, see GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 51-60 (describing the second
tier in more detail).
21 See GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 51 (noting that with a few exceptions, public sector
employees do not participate in a complementary regime because their base benefits are judged
to be sufficient).
22 See Lavigne, supra note 8, at 146 tbl.16; GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 27; Jean-Luc
Grdau, Fonds de pension: les grandes illusions, 108 LE DEBAT 18, 21 (Jan.-Feb. 2000).
23 For a more detailed description of supplementary occupational plans, see Moore, supra
note 1, at 469-7 1; GREctANO, supra note 17, at 60-68; and CHARPENTIER, supra note 11, at
264-335.
2 4 See supra note 1I and accompanying text.
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maintained,25 current benefits are funded principally with current contributions.
Only the third tier of the French retirement system, the supplementary
occupational plans, is pre-funded, and, as noted above, it currently plays a
relatively minor role in the French retirement system. Whether, or how much, the
role of the third tier should be expanded is a significant issue in the reform debate
in France today. 26
The final principal feature of the French retirement system is its relative
generosity.27 In 1993, French public pensions provided a replacement rate of 69%
of the average salary, compared to 42% in the United States.28 Of course, this
comparison does not take into account private employer-sponsored pensions, and
these plans play a much more significant role in the United States than they do in
France.29
III. RECENT REFORMS OF THE FRENCH RETIREMENT SYSTEM
France, like the United States, is facing two significant demographic changes.
First, life expectancy is increasing. In 1950, life expectancy at age sixty was 15.4
years for French men and 18.4 years for French women.30 By 2000, life
expectancy at age sixty had increased to 20.2 years for men and 25.6 years for
women, and, by 2040, life expectancy is projected to further increase to 25.9
years for men and 31.0 years for women.3 1 Second, France has a large baby boom
25 The 1999 social security financing law created a temporary reserve that will be used to
pay general regime benefits between 2020 and 2040. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying
text. ARRCO maintains a reserve equal to about one year's worth of benefits. See FRANCIS
KESSLER, DROIT DE LA PROTECTION SOCIALE 382 n.2 (2000).
26 Of course, this is not the only significant issue in the debate today. See supra note 8. It
is, however, the only issue that this Article addresses.
27 See Martine Durand, Comment, in SOCIAL SECURITY PENSION REFORM IN EUROPE 127,
131 (Martin Feldstein & Horst Siebert eds., 2002) (citing Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) study that shows the French replacement rate is among
the highest in the major OECD countries); GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 69 (showing that
France offers one of the highest replacement rates in Europe).
28 Bruno Palier & Giuliano Bonoli, La montge en puissance des fonds de pension: Une
lecture comparative des reformes des systmes de retraite, entre modile global et
cheminements nationaux, 4 L'ANNEE DE LA REGULATION 209, 217 (2000) (noting that the
replacement rate in the Netherlands and Great Britain was 33%, compared to 36% in
Switzerland, 42% in the United States, 34% in Denmark, 53% in Germany, 69% in France, and
78% in Italy).
29 Cf. Giuliano Bonoli, Pension Politics in France: Patterns of Co-operation and Conflict
in Two Recent Reforms, 20 W. EuR. POL. 111, 112 (1997) (noting that almost 70% of
retirement income in France comes from public arrangements compared with less than 50% in
Britain).
30 CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION, supra note 6, at 24-25.
31 Id.
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generation that is followed by relatively smaller generations. 32 Principally as a
result of these demographic changes, the elderly dependency ratio, the ratio of
retirees to working age individuals, is expected to increase from .38 in 2000 to
between .61 and .73 (depending on mortality assumptions) in 2040.33 This
increased dependency ratio is placing significant pressure on the French
retirement system because it is funded principally on a pay-as-you-go basis. 34
French policymakers frst began to recognize the need to reform the French
retirement system in light of these demographic changes in the 1980s.35 During
that decade, the government published a number of reports explaining the need to
reform the system,36 but serious public debate did not occur until the publication
of the White Book37 in 1991.38 The first major reform of the system was enacted
of 1993, 39 and the French retirement system has been reformed a multitude of
times in a multitude of ways since then. This Section will briefly describe the
most significant of these reforms, as well as other significant reforms that were
proposed, but ultimately failed.
A. First Tier Reforms
During the summer of 1993, the Balladur government reformed the general
regime 40 in three different ways, and the effect of each was to reduce
3 2 Id. at 107.
3 3 Id.
34 See Moore, supra note 1, at 475 & n.246 and authorities cited therein.
35 Bonoli, supra note 29, at 115 ("Perhaps one of the most striking features of French
pension policy throughout the 1980s and early 1990s is the gap between the official debate,
where the need for a reform is emphasised [sic], and the practice of pension policy, in which no
action was taken until 1993."); see also Blanchet & Legros, supra note 12, at 113 ("Questions
have been intensively raised about the long-term viability of this system during the 1980s.").
36 Bonoli, supra note 29, at 115 (noting that "between 1985 and 1993 at least seven
official reports were produced, which, moreover, made roughly the same suggestions as to how
to reform pensions"); see also GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 173-74 (discussing reports that
were issued during the 1980s).
37 Commissariat Gdn6ral du Plan, Livre blanc sur les retraites: garantir dans 1'4quit6 les
retraites de demain (199 1).
38 Didier Blanchet, Population Aging and French Economic Performance, in AGING
SOCIETIES: THE GLOBAL DIMENSION 111, 127 (Barry Bosworth & Gary Burtless eds., 1998).
39 Contribution rates, however, were already increased between 1985 and 1991. See Palier
& Bonoli, supra note 28, at 225 (noting that between 1985 and 1991 contribution rates for the
general regime were increased from 4.7% to 6.55% of the general regime wage ceiling);
Bonoli, supra note 29, at 115 (noting that an additional 1.6% employer contribution was added
in 1990).
40 These reforms also apply to the three base regimes that are "aligned" with the general
regime: the base regime for salaried agricultural workers, the base regime for industrialists and
merchants, and the base regime for craftsmen.
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benefits.4 1 As noted above, the general regime uses a defined benefit formula to
calculate benefits. That formula may be described as P = S.A.M x t x d/D, where
P represents pension, S.A.M is average annual salary (capped at the social
security wage ceiling-which is roughly equivalent to the average wage),42 t
stands for rate, d is duration of participation in the general regime, and D equals
maximum duration of participation taken into account.43 Prior to the 1993 reform,
the first element of that formula, average annual salary, was based on the retiree's
highest ten years of earnings.44 The 1993 reform gradually increases the number
of years of salary taken into account until it reaches twenty-five years of earnings
for retirees who reach age sixty on or after January 1, 2008.45 The second element
of the formula, rate, is capped at fifty percent and is generally a function of both
the age at which the retiree begins to collect benefits and the amount of time the
retiree contributed to any base regime. 46 Prior to the 1993 reform, retirees were
entitled to begin collecting benefits at age sixty at the maximum rate of fifty
percent if they had 150 quarters, or 37.5 years, of participation in a base regime
by age 60.47 The 1993 reform gradually increases the number of quarters required
for benefits at the maximum rate to 160 quarters or 40 years by 2008.48 Finally,
the third change wrought by the 1993 reform was a change in the method of
indexing from one based on changes in wages to one based on changes in
prices.49
In conjunction with the three changes described above, the 1993 reform also
established an "old-age solidarity fund" (fonds de solidarit vieillesse (FSV)) to
provide general tax financing 50 for certain non-contributory retirement benefits. 51
41 According to one study, these changes will reduce the average retirement benefit by
about thirty percent. Palier & Bonoli, supra note 28, at 227-28 (citing A. Babeau, Problkmes
posds par l'introduction desfonds depension en France, in MIRE: I COMPARER LES SYSTtMES
DE PROTECTION SOCIALE EN EUROPE DU SUD: RENCONTRES DE FLORENCE 293, 295 (1997)).
42 See Blanchet & Legros, supra note 12, at 113.
43 See JEAN-JACQUES DUPEYROUX, DROIT DE LA SICURITE SOCIALE 472 (13th ed. 1998).
44 See Moore, supra note 1, at 452 and authorities cited therein.
4 5 Id.
4 6 Id.
4 7 Id. at 452-53 and authorities cited therein.
48 Id. at 453 and authorities cited therein.
4 9 Id. at 477. Actually, as a result of a series of laws that had been enacted prior to 1987,
benefits had already been indexed to changes in prices rather than wages since 1987. Id. at 477
n.258. In addition, the 1993 reform was only to apply for five years but has been continued
since then. See Palier & Bonoli, supra note 28, at 226.
50 For a discussion of the sources of revenue for the FSV, see Moore, supra note 1, at
480-81 and authorities cited therein.
51 Specifically, it funds minimum retirement benefits and additional retirement benefits
awarded for periods of unemployment, national service, and time out of the workforce to raise
children. See id. at 480 n.273 and authorities cited therein; Bonoli, supra note 29, at 118.
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Prior to the 1993 reform, these non-contributory benefits were partially financed
by wage-related contributions to the retirement regimes. 52 This shift in the
financing of these non-contributory benefits was very important to the labor
movement and is viewed as a key factor in the political success of the 1993
reform.53
In November 1995, then-Prime Minister Alain Jupp6 sought to reform the
special regimes (the base regimes applicable to public and parapublic employees)
to create greater uniformity between the base regimes. 54 Among other things,55
he proposed both to increase the number of years of participation required for
retirement at the full rate from 37.5 years to forty years and base benefits on the
best twenty-five (rather than ten) years of salary. 56 The proposed reform,
however, met with such fierce public opposition that it was quickly abandoned.57
Commentators contend that the failure of this proposed reform was due at least in
part to the government's failure to negotiate with the country's trade unions prior
to introducing this reform.58
In the spring of 2003, French leaders renewed calls to bring the special
regimes in alignment with the general regime.59 Like the Jupp6 proposal, the
52 See Moore, supra note 1, at n.273 and authorities cited therein; Bonoli, supra note 29, at
118.
53 See GIuLIANO BONOLI, THE POLInCS OF PENSION REFORM: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY
CHANGE IN WESTERN EUROPE 138 (2000); Palier & Bonoli, supra note 28, at 226-27; Bonoli,
supra note 29, at 118-19. But see GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 179 (suggesting that social
partners did not object to 1993 reform because government reports issued during preceding
decade had convinced them that the reform was necessary and unavoidable).
54 See Bonoli, supra note 29, at 120 (noting that the content of the 1995 proposed reform
of the special regimes was "roughly the same" as that of the 1993 reform of the general
regime).
55 The proposed reform also included measures aimed at increasing the state's control
over the state's health insurance system. Although the pension reform was abandoned, the other
proposals were gradually implemented throughout 1996 and 1997. See Bonoli, supra note 29,
at 120-21.
56 See Palier & Bonoli, supra note 28, at 227; Bruno Palier, A 'Liberal' Dynamic in the
Transformation of the French Social Welfare System, in SOCIAL INSURANCE IN EUROPE 84, 104
(Jochen Clasen ed., 1997).
57 In response to government plans to raise the retirement age for public sector employees,
a rail strike virtually paralysed the French railway system for some three weeks. Rail workers
were quickly joined in their protest by post-office employees, teachers and other civil servants.
The result was a massive protest movement, with daily demonstrations in Paris and in other
major cities. At its peak, some two million people were reported to have taken to the streets.
Losses for the French economy were substantial. Because of the rail and underground strikes,
central Paris could not be reached from its outskirts in less than four or five hours. Eventually,
after having repeatedly rejected the trade unions' requests, Prime Minister Alain Jupp6 decided
to abandon plans for public-sector pension reform. Bonoli, supra note 29, at 111.
58 See, e.g., Palier & Bonoli, supra note 28, at 227; Bonoli, supra note 29, at 112.
59 Recognizing the power of rail workers to disrupt the proposed reform, the plan does not
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Fillon plan (named after the Minister for Labor and Social Affairs) proposed,
among other things, to increase the number of years of participation required for
retirement at the full rate from 37.5 years to forty years by 2008.60 Although the
trade unions organized demonstrations and strikes against the Fillon plan,61 the
French govemment made more of an effort to negotiate with the trade unions 62
and the proposed reform was approved by the National Assembly on July 3,
2003,63 and received Senate approval soon thereafter.64
Although the base regimes have historically been funded almost exclusively
on a pay-as-you-go basis,65 the 1999 social security financing law broke with this
apply to the special regimes for metro and railway workers. See Lara Marlowe, Pension
reforms prompt massive street protests, THE IRISH TIMES, May 26, 2003, at 12.
60 Expos6 des Motifs, supra note 7, at 3. The required years of participation in all regimes
will then increase to forty-one years in 2012 and thereafter in tandem with increases in life
expectancy. Id at art. 5, 10-11.
61 See Paul Webster, Jam session Strikes and marches paralyse French cities, THE
GUARDIAN, June 4, 2003, at 14 (describing French strikes made in protest to Prime Minister
Jean-Pierre Raffarin's proposal to bring the special regimes in alignment with the general
regime); John Tagliabue, Protest Strike in France Interrupts Travel, N.Y. TIMEs, April 4, 2003,
at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/04/intemational/europe/04PARI.html
(same); Kim Housego, Worker Strike Paralyzes France, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, April 4,
2003, at All (same).
62 See, e.g., Expos6 des Motifs, supra note 7 at 2 (describing the Government's efforts to
provide social partners with the opportunity to discuss principles of reform proposals before the
principles were formally introduced and the "true negotiation" with social partners on May 14
and 15 that led to approval of proposed reform by five of the eight trade unions and employer
organizations); Frangois Wenz-Dumas, Reforme des retraites: apr~s les consultations,
l'ex&ution, LIIERATION, April 1, 2003, http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=100119
(noting that after a month and a half of "technical discussions," the Work Minister gave the
social partners a document summarizing the "principles," "objectives," and "means" of reform;
the social partners have about a week and a half to give their opinion on the text before it will be
finalized and released on April 11, 2003); see also Carol Matlack, Commentary: France: Labor
Disarray Is Giving Reform a Chance, BUSINEss WEEK, June 16, 2003, at 48 (contending that
Prime Minister Raffarin's regular consultation with labor leaders played an important role
making pension reform possible in 2003); Martin Rhodes & David Natali, France's dialogue of
the deaf over pensions, FINANCIAL TImEs, June 13, 2003 at 19 ("President Chirac says the way
of the dispute is 'social dialogue', referring to the consultation and negotiation that typically
precedes any effective pensions reform in Europe.").
63 See Beatrice Taupin, L 'Assemblke n 'a modifi qu 'b la marge le projet Fillon-Delevoye,
LE FIGARO ECONOMIE, July 4, 2003 at Ill.
64 See Site d'information sur l'avenir des retraites, Le Parlement adopte definitivement la
reforme des retraites (July 25, 2003), at http://www.retraites.gouv.fr/article389.html (noting the
French Parliament definitively adopted reform on July 25, 2003) [hereinafter Article 389].
65 See Blanchet & Legros, supra note 12, at 111 ("One characteristic [of the French
pension system] is its almost exclusive reliance on PAYGO financing: French pension schemes
did not accumulate more than marginal provisions, covering no more than a few months' worth
of benefits.").
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tradition and created a reserve to finance future general regime retirement
benefits. 66 The law's objective is to accumulate financial reserves on the order of
150 billion Euros between 1999 and 2020 and use the reserve to pay benefits
between 2020 and 2040.67 The reserves had reached 7.9 trillion Euros by the end
of 2001 and were expected to have reached thirteen trillion Euros by the end of
2002.68
B. Second Tier Reforms
During the 1990s, the social partners amended the mandatory complementary
retirement regimes for private sector employees (ARRCO and AGIRC) a number
of times, in a number of ways, to increase contributions and reduce benefits. 69
According to management, the effect of these changes (combined with the 1993
amendments to the general regime) was to reduce the replacement rate for
managers from 66% of final average salary in 1996 to 62% of final average salary
in 2005 and to reduce the replacement rate for non-managers from 73% of final
average salary in 1996 to 71% of final average salary in 2005.70 According to the
Confed&ation G~niral du Travail, a trade union of Communist inspiration, 71 the
effect of these changes was to reduce the rights of managers by 20% in five years
and the rights of non-managers by 17.5% in five years.72
In the spring of 2003, the French government proposed to create a new
66 See Law No. 98-1194 of December 23, 1998, J.O., December 27, 1998, p. 19643,
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/index2.himl (last visited Feb. 14, 2004).
Currently, the reserve only applies to the general regime and the base regimes that are "aligned"
with the general regime. Of significance, it does not apply to the special regimes. J.F. Chadelat,
French Reserve Funds, 12 LA LETrRE DE L'OBERSERVATOIRE DES RETRAITES 9, 9, 10 (Nov.
2001).
67 CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION, supra note 6, at 79; Chadelat, supra note 66, at 9, 10.
68 CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION, supra note 6, at 80. For a more detailed discussion of the
reserve, see GRECLANO, supra note 17, at 197-201. For a brief overview of some of the
arguments made in opposition to the find, see Lavigne, supra note 8, at 137.
69 For a more detailed discussion of these changes, see Moore, supra note 1, at 476-79;
GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 182-83. ARRCO and AGIRC were amended again in 2001 to
reduce benefits. See CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION, supra note 6, at 74; GRECLANO, supra note 17, at
207-09.
70 Laurent Caussat, Les accords du 25 avril 1996 relatifs aux rgimes interprofessionnels
de retraite compldmentaire: un exercice d'alerte avant l'arrivie du cyclone?, 7/8 DROIT
SocIAL 729, 732-33 (1996).
71 See Bonoli, supra note 29, at 117 n. 16 (describing the five major national federations of
trade unions and noting that the CGT, of Communist inspiration, is the farthest left on the
political spectrum).
72 Fabienne Muller, Les accords du 25 avril 1996. un tournant pour les rigimes
obligatoires de retraite complmentaire?, 32 REVUE DE DROIT SANITAIRE SOCIALE 647, 652
(1996).
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mandatory complementary retirement regime for shopkeepers and industrialists. 73
The National Assembly adopted the proposal on July 3, 2003; 74 the Senate
approved it shortly thereafter. 75
C. Third Tier Reforms
In 1994, the French legislature enacted a law (referred to as the Madelin law)
which, among other things, permits the self-employed to make voluntary tax
deductible contributions to supplementary retirement plans.76 Contributions are
tax deductible and benefits must be paid in the form of an annuity. 77 The law is
viewed as a limited success with about two million self-employed individuals
contributing about 700 million Euros to such plans in 2000.78
In 1997, the French legislature enacted a law (referred to as the Thomas law
after the Conservative deputy who drafted the proposal)79 creating retirement
savings plans (plans d'jpargne retraite).80 The retirement savings plans were
quite similar to American 401(k) plans: they were optional, defined contribution
plans for which employer and employee contributions were tax exempt.81 The
principal difference between the retirement savings plans and American 401(k)
plans was that benefits from the retirement savings plans were required to be
distributed in the form of an annuity.82 The law provided that these retirement
savings plans were to be available to all private sector workers covered by the
general regime (or agricultural regime) and ARRCO and AGIRC and were to be
managed by insurance companies.83 The law was highly controversial from the
outset,84 and when a new government took power a few months after the law was
73 Expos6 des Motifs, supra note 7, at Titre IV, 35-41.
74 See Taupin, supra note 63.
75 See Article 389, supra note 64.
76 Law No. 94-126 of February 11, 1994, J.O., February 12, 1994, p. 2493, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheExperteLegi.jsp (last visited Feb. 14, 2004).
77 Fluvia Brunet, Les travailleurs indcpendants, ENssIB: RAPPORT DE RECHERCHE
BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE 46 (Mar. 2002).
78 Lavigne, supra note 8, at 133, 147, tbl.17. For a more detailed discussion of the reasons
why the Madelin law is of limited success, see CHARPENTIER, supra note 11, at 310-18.
79 Lavigne, supra note 8, at 128.
80 See Law No. 97-277 of Mar. 25, 1997, J.O., Mar. 26, 1997, p. 4657, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheExperteLegi.jsp (last visited Feb. 14, 2004).
81 Lavigne, supra note 8, at 138; GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 184; Lawrence J. Speer,
French Government's Pension Reserve Fund Will Grow Dramatically in Future, 26 Pens. &
Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2362 (Oct. 4, 1999).
82 See Lavigne, supra note 8, at 138.
83 Moore, supra note 1, at 472 and authorities cited therein.
84 "Me entire trade union movement-including the managers union (CGC)--strongly
opposed the law mainly on the ground that exemption of taxation on employers' contributions
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enacted, 85 it declined to promulgate the eleven decrees required to give effect to
the law.86 The law was officially abrogated in 2002.87
In February 2001, French law introduced two new savings instruments: inter-
company savings plans (plan d'gpargne interentreprises) and voluntary salary
savings plans (plan parternarial d'gpargne salariale volontaire).88 Although
technically not retirement savings vehicles, 89 they were intended to "introduc[e] a
retirement-like horizon to collective saving"90 and may be viewed as close
substitutes for private pension plans.91
Prior to the introduction of these new savings vehicles, French law
recognized two types of profit-sharing plans: voluntary interest (intgressement)
plans and mandatory participation (participation) plans.92 The interest plans were
introduced in 1959 and provide for the voluntary sharing of profits pursuant to a
contractually determined formula.93 The participation plans, introduced in 1967,
are mandatory for firms with more than fifty employees (and voluntary for
smaller firms) and provide for the sharing of profits pursuant to a statutorily
jeopardised existing compulsory complementary schemes." BRUNO THERET & JEAN-CLAUDE
BARBIER, ON THE ENDOGENOUS CAPACITY OF NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION TO
ADDRESS THE GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGE: THE FRENCH CASE 27 (Feb. 2002); see also
GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 185 (describing objections to Thomas law).
85 "The new scheme being more substitutive than additional, left wing parties promised to
scrap it if elected." Thdret & Barbier, supra, note 84, at 27.
86 See Moore, supra note 1, at 472 and authorities cited therein.
87 See Lavigne, supra note 8, at 128; GRECiANO, supra note 17, at 185.
88Law No. 2001-152 of Feb. 19, 2001, J.O., February 20, 2001, at 2774, available at
http://www.legifiance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheExperteLegi.jsp (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
89 See GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 206 (noting that the "retirement" is never expressly
mentioned anywhere in the text of the February 19, 2001 law).
90 Lavigne, supra note 8, at 138.
91 1d; cf Still a dirty word---The courage needed to reform French pensions, THE
ECONOMIST, June 8, 2002, at 48 (" '[The voluntary salary savings plan is] a pension fund in
disguise but the government avoided using that ideology-charged term,' says Stephane Deo at
US Warburg, a bank.").
In fact, some commentators include these new savings instruments as well as the closely
related voluntary interest plans, mandatory participation plans, and company savings plans
described below in their discussion of the third tier of the French retirement system. See, e.g,
GRECANO, supra note 17, at 60-68, 201-06; cf CHARPENTIER, supra note 11, at 318 (noting
that profit-sharing plans and company savings plans are not part of the retirement regime but
contending that they are worth including in a study of retirement and pension plans because few
employees currently participate in a supplementary occupational plan and these savings
mechanisms could constitute an excellent bridge toward pension plans).
92 Lavigne, supra note 8, at 137; GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 60.
93 GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 60-61; Fathi Fakhfakh & Virginie Perotin, The Effects of
Profit-sharing Schemes on Enterprise Performance in France, 3 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 93
(2000).
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mandated formula. 94 Among other places, profits from these plans (as well as
voluntary employee or employer contributions) may be contributed to company
savings plans (plan d'6pargne entreprise) and are exempt from taxation if
distributed after five or more years.95
The inter-company savings plans, introduced in the February 2001
legislation, were designed to provide small and medium firms with incentives to
offer company savings plans.96 In 1998, only 3.5 percent of firms offered a
company savings plan with larger firms far more likely to offer such plans than
smaller firms.97 The inter-company savings plans permit several firms, on an
industry sector or geographic basis, to offer a joint company savings plan. The
voluntary salary savings plans, also introduced in February 2001, promote a
longer savings horizon by requiring participants to save for ten, rather than five,
years in order to be eligible for favorable tax treatment.98
In the spring of 2003, the Fillon plan proposed that a new product be added to
the third tier of the French retirement system, the retirement savings plan (le plan
d' pargne pour la retraite). These retirement savings plans are similar, but not
identical to the retirement savings plans introduced by the Thomas law. First,
unlike the first retirement savings plans, the new retirement savings plans are to
be available to all workers, not just private sector workers.99 Workers can
participate in these plans individually, through their employer, or through a
professional organization. 100 Like the Thomas retirement savings plans, the new
retirement savings plans must be paid in the form of an annuity 0 1 and are eligible
for tax favorable treatment. 102
The Fillon plan also proposed to transform the voluntary salary savings plans,
created in 2001, into voluntary salary savings plans for retirement (plan
94 GRECLANO, supra note 17, at 61; Fakhfakh & Perotin, supra note 93, at 95. That
formula is RSP = 0.5 x (B - 0.05C) x SNA, where B is defined as annual profit, C as capital, S
as salaries, and VA as the value added by the firm. Lavigne, supra note 8, at 137-38.
95 GREcIANo, supra note 17, at 61-62; Lavigne, supra note 8, at 138. Employees' interest
in participation plans vest after five years and may be invested in a variety of vehicles, including
mutual funds, equity, company stock, and Company Savings Plans. Profits from interest plans
may be immediately distributed-and taxed--to employees or invested in company savings
plans and become tax exempt after five years. See id. at 138.
96 Lavigne, supra note 8, at 138.
97 Id.
98 Id. For a more detailed discussion of the rules applicable to the Voluntary Salary
Savings Plans as well as the rules applicable to participation plans, interest plans, Company
Savings Plans, and Inter-Company Savings Plans, see GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 201-06.
99 Exposd des Motifs, Art. 79, supra note 7, at 42.
101 Id.
102 Od.102 Exposd des Motifs, Art. 8 1, supra note 7, at 42.
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partenarial d'pargne salariale volontaire pour la retraite)t 0 3 Under the new
voluntary salary savings plans, the participant can choose to receive benefits in
the form of a lump sum or annuity, but benefits cannot be distributed until the
participant reaches retirement age.10 4 The new law prohibits participants from
investing more than five percent of their investments in employer stock.10 5 Like
the rest of the Fillon plan, these proposed changes were approved by the National
Assembly on July 3, 2003, and approved by the Senate shortly thereafter. 10 6
IV. THE FUNDING DEBATE
As the preceding discussion illustrates, expansion of the third tier of the
French retirement system has been a significant issue in the French retirement
debate. One law enacted in the last decade, the Madelin law, clearly expanded the
third tier of the French retirement system. °7 That expansion, however, was
necessarily modest because it only affected the self-employed, who represent a
mere twelve percent of the French working population. 108 A second law enacted
in the 1990s, the Thomas law, had the potential to substantially expand the third
tier because it applied to all private sector employees, the largest segment of the
French working population. 10 9 That law, however, never went into effect and thus
did not in fact expand the third tier. The third law, the February 2001 law
introducing inter-company savings plans and voluntary salary savings plans, may
be viewed as expanding the third tier because it introduces two new savings
vehicles that are close substitutes for private pensions." ° The two vehicles,
however, are not technically private pensions and thus do not technically expand
the third tier. Finally, the most recent expansion of the third tier occurred in the
summer of 2003, when the French Parliament approved the Fillon plan and its
introduction of retirement savings plans."' At the time this Article when to press,
however, it was too early to tell how widespread these plans would become and
thus how effective they would be in expanding the third tier.1 2 This Section will
highlight the principal arguments presented in the debate regarding the expansion
103 Id.
104 Id
105 Exposd des Motifs, Art. 81, supra note 7, at 42.
106 See Article 389, supra note 64.
107 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
108 For additional reasons why the change was of limited success, see CHARPENTIER,
supra note 11, at 310-18.
109 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
111 See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
112 See Article 389, supra note 64.
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of the third tier.113
First, proponents of expanding the third tier have argued that a pre-funded
system would be able to better withstand the demographic shock France is
facing.11 4 Opponents note that economists have shown that a pre-funded system
is no better able to withstand demographic shocks than a pay-as-you-go
system,115 and in fact, the current pay-as-you-go system may paradoxically
benefit from the impending demographic changes.116
Proponents of expanding the third tier further contend that, with any given
demographic variable, a pre-funded system offers a better long-term rate of return
and thus constitutes a more globally efficient system.' 17 This argument rests on
the beliefs that capital's higher rates of return are due to insufficient savings and
pre-funding provides a means to increase savings. 118 Not all opponents of
expanding the third tier accept that there is a need to increase savings in
France, 119 and even those who accept that a pre-funded system may be more
efficient in the long-term contend that the short and medium-term costs of shifting
from a pay-as-you-go system to a pre-funded system outweigh the long-term
113 For a detailed description of the theoretical debate of pay-as-you-go versus funded
pensions, see GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 126-37. For a chart summarizing the arguments,
proponents, and philosophies in this debate on an international level, see Thdret and Barbier,
supra note 84, at 31.
114 WILLIAM D. CRIST & JEAN-CHRIsTOPHE LE DuGou, POUR & CONTRE LES FONDs DE
PENSION 42 (2002); GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 189; Didier Blanchet, Le ddbat rpartition-
capitalisation: un etat des lieux, in Retraite et tpargne, Rapport du Conseil d'analysd
Economique 93 (1998).
115 GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 127, 189; Blanchet, supra note 114, at 94-95; CRIST &
LE DUIGOU, supra note 114, at 42-43, 81-83, 124-26; Blanchet & Legros, supra note 12, at
119; see also Nicholas Barr, Reforming Pensions: Myths, Truths, and Policy Choices, IMF
Working Paper WP/00/139, at 8-11 (Aug. 2000) (explaining why pre-funded systems are no
better able to withstand demographic shocks than pay-as-you-go systems).
116 Blanchet & Legros, supra note 12, at 119 n.2; CRIST & LE DuiGou, supra note 114, at
50-51.
117 See Blanchet, supra note 114, at 94; GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 189.
118 See GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 127-28; Blanchet, supra note 114, at 94-95;
Blanchet & Legros, supra note 12, at 119.
119 CRIST & LE DuIGou, supra note 114, at 93-94 (contending that French savings rate
does not need to be increased but that savings simply need to be reallocated and creating third
tier private pensions not necessary to reallocate savings); see also Florence Legros, Pension
Schemes: Limiting PAYG to Increase Savings?, La Lettre du CEPII (Centre d'etudes
prospectives et d'informations internationales) May 2002, at 2 (showing that contrary to
expectations, France, with only pay-as-you-go pension schemes, has much higher savings rate
than United States, with significant pre-funded pension schemes); ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION AND DEV., ECONOMIC OUTLOOK NO. 72 annex tbl. 24 (2002) (showing that
household savings rate in France was 11.4% in 2001 compared with 2.3% in the United States
that year).
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benefits of such a system. 120
Proponents of expanding the third tier also contend that shifting to a pre-
funded system will protect future retirees from the political risk that the future
working generation will be unwilling to pay the high contribution rates necessary
to fund their future benefits. 121 In making this argument, proponents may note
that the French already devote almost thirteen percent of their GNP to financing
retirement benefits compared to only five percent in the United States. 122
Opponents of expanding the third tier note that pre-funded systems are not
riskless; they are subject to investment risk that can be quite substantial,
particularly in light of the impending demographic shift which is likely to lead to
much lower rates of return.123 Indeed, opponents of expanding the third tier point
to the failure of pre-fumded schemes in France in the 1930s to unequivocally
demonstrate that pre-funded schemes are subject to real and substantial risks. 124
The current pay-as-you-go system was actually established in large part in
response to the fact that pre-funded schemes failed in the 1930s due in large part
to inflation and other monetary pressures. 125
Proponents of expanding the third tier contend that private pensions are
ideologically superior to a pay-as-you-go system because they promote individual
choice. Each individual should have the power to determine how much of his
income he wants to spend, how much he wants to save, and when he begins his
retirement. 126 Opponents respond that greater choice will simply lead to greater
120 See Blanchet, supra note 114, at 94; Blanchet & Legros, supra note 12, at 119-20; see
also CRIST & LE DuIGou, supra note 114, at 50-51 (contending that converting to pre-funded
system would exacerbate problems the current system faces as a result of impending
demographic changes).
121 See GREcIANo, supra note 17, at 126-27; Blanchet, supra note 114, at 94; CRIST & LE
DumIou, supra note 114, at 127, 133-34.
122 Blanchet, supra note 114, at 105.
123 CRIST & LE DuiGou, supra note 114, at 95-96.
124 Id. at 87-88; see GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 121.
125 One author observed:
The preference for pay-as-you-go at the time of the Liberation undoubtedly
owed much to the experience of inflation, to impoverishment across the country
at large, and, above all, to the "failure" of social insurance; the latter institution
had been funding retirement pensions since 14 March 1941 without a review of
old-age insurance.
ANNE-MARIE GUILLEMARD, AGING AND THE WELFARE-STATE CRIsIs 53 (2000); see also
GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 20 (noting that pay-as-you-go financing was justified in 1945 by
the strong uncertainties regarding the level and future evolution of economic activity (notably
marked by high inflation which significantly reduced the value of annuities) which prohibited,
at least in the short term, a return to a pre-funded system).
126 See CRIST & LE DU1GOu, supra note 114, at 43-45; GRECLANO, supra note 17, at 189.
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inequality. 127 Private pensions impose investment risk on individuals and provide
participants with no guarantees regarding future returns. Moreover, expanding the
third tier places the current pay-as-you-go system at risk.1 2 8
Proponents of expanding the third tier also contend that creating private
pensions will permit the French to regain control over their companies. They note
that foreign investors, and particularly foreign pension plans, have invested so
heavily in French companies that the French no longer have control of their own
enterprises. 129 Proponents contend that creating private pensions would provide
the long-term capital necessary for the French to regain control of their enterprises
and thus their economy.' 30 Opponents of expanding the third tier may concede
that the French need to regain control of their economy and enterprises but argue
that development of private pensions is not the only, or the best answer.13 1
Reorganizing existing savings rather than creating new savings is all that is
needed for the French to regain control of their companies. 13 2
V. LESSONS FROM THE FUNDING DEBATE
The French funding debate offers Americans at least four different lessons.
First, there simply is not much new under the sun. Most of the arguments in the
French funding debate-particularly the economic arguments-are strikingly
similar to the arguments made in the American privatization debate. Of course,
the fact that the economic arguments are strikingly similarly should come as no
surprise. Economics is an international discipline. The work of American
economists has appeared in the French debate, 133 and Americans have invited
127 GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 189.
12 8 See CRIST & LE DuiGou, supra note 114, at 51-52, 131-32; GRECIANO, supra note
17, at 189.
129 See CRIST & LE DuIGou, supra note 114, at 46 (noting that American pension plans
own about one-third of the 40 largest French companies); Lavigne, supra note 8, at 137 (noting
that "about 40 per cent [sic] of equities issued by French quoted firms are held by foreign
investors"); see also GRECiANO, supra note 17, at 134 (noting significant influence of
Anglo/American pension funds on governance of large French corporations).
130 GREciANO, supra note 17, at 189.
131 CRIST & LE DUIGOU, supra note 114, at 45-46.
132 Id. at 46 (noting that 150 billion French francs, often more, are invested abroad, and
that French investments tend to be in public and private bonds rather than equities); see also
GRECIANO, supra note 17, at 150-51 (describing overwhelmingly conservative nature of
French investments).
133 Of particular significance, William Dale Crist, economist and President of the
California Public Employees' Retirement Fund (CalPERS), and Jean-Christophe Le Duigou,
the secretary national of the CGT (Confdd6ration Gkn~rale du Travail, a trade union of
Communist origin) responsible for economic questions, in CRIST & LE DUIGOU, supra note
114.
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French economists to participate in their international debates. 134
The second lesson is that although the economic arguments may be strikingly
similar, the funding debates are not identical. First, and foremost, the French
funding debate occurs at an entirely different level. The French are giving no
consideration whatsoever to privatizing---that is, creating individual accounts
in--their first tier base regimes. Instead, the funding debate focuses on expanding
the role of third tier voluntary pre-funded pension plans. 135
This difference may be partially historical. 136 The current, extensive, pay-as-
you-go system was established, in large part, in response to the failure of pre-
funded retirement schemes in the 1930s. For example, in arguing for a pay-as-
you-go system in 1945, one advocate declared:
[F]unded plans must be abandoned at once. We know their
advantages. We know that the money deposited in them yields a
profit and that we can gradually become entitled to larger sums
than we have actually invested. But we are all aware of the sad
experiences of the last few years. We know that devaluation has
followed devaluation, that the value of money has gone down
daily, that those of you who thought that a little pension of
twenty thousand francs was ample for your needs now have
hardly enough to live on for a month. It is therefore absolutely
vital to replace this system with a pay-as-you-go plan that allows
the real resources to be shared constantly among all members. 137
The United States does not have a shared history of failed funded schemes.
Rather, the United States has a history of failed unfunded or underfunded plans
134 For example, Didier Blanchet, an economist with the French National Institute of
Demographic Studies, is a regular contributor to international economic conferences sponsored
by such American groups as the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Brookings
Institution. See, e.g., Mahieu & Blanchet, supra note 8; Blanchet & Legros, supra note 12;
Didier Blanchet & Louis-Paul Peld, Social Security and Retirement in France, in SociAL
SECURITY AND RETIREMENT AROUND THE WORLD 101 (Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise
eds., 1999); Blanchet, supra note 38.
135 One may argue that expanding the third tier while cutting back on the first tier is
economically identical to privatizing the first tier. However true that may be, these changes are
quite different from a political and ideological standpoint.
136 Lavigne, supra note 8, at 136:
The French history was plagued by the collapse of funded pension schemes in the
1930s due to the economic recession and runaway inflation. Many French families still
remember this grievous episode, even if the persons who experienced it are less and less
numerous. This may explain the reluctance of successive governments to implement
pension funds in France ....
137 GUILLEMARD, supra note 125, at 65 (internal quotations omitted).
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which led to the enactment of ERISA,138 the federal law which requires, among
other things, that private pension plans be funded. 139
The difference may also be partially ideological. Although individual choice
is occasionally raised as an interest worth promoting in the French funding
debate, individual choice-and individual responsibility-is much more of an
American value 140 than a French value. Indeed, the terminology used in the
respective debates helps to illustrate the different ideological values. The French
do not use the term "pay-as-you-go" to describe the principal funding mechanism
of their retirement system. Instead, they use the term "r~partition," which means
"distribution" in English. 141 "Pay-as-you-go" seems to suggest something a little
irresponsible about the funding mechanism while "distribution" appears a bit
more neutral 142 and perhaps even praiseworthy in a socialist society. 143
Moreover, the French do not use the Anglo/American term "funded," "which
gives an impression of seriousness and security"'144 in describing pension
funding. Instead, they use the term "capitalisation," which "evokes capitalism, a
word which remains linked with the exploitation of workers in the nineteenth
century in many minds." 145
These ideological differences are further illustrated by the differing role of
grass roots politics. The weekend before Prime Minister Raffarin was scheduled
to officially launch the latest round of reform of the French retirement system,
thousands of French citizens took to the streets to express their concerns and
objections. Among the many banners and slogans seen during the demonstrations
was "Sauvons la r~partition!" (Save our pay-as-you-go system!). 146 It is hard to
imagine thousands of Americans marching on the Mall in D.C. to save our pay-
138 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2002); see generally, James A. Wooten, "The Most
Glorious Story of Failure in the Business": The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the
Origins of ERISA, 49 BuFFALo L. REV. 683 (2001) (discussing the role of the failed
underfunded Studebaker plan in the enactment of ERISA).
139 ERISA §§ 301-08; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86 (2002).
140 Cf CRIST & LE DUIGOU, supra note 114, at 103 American William Crist, President of
CalPERS, contends that the principal advantage of private pensions is that we ourselves are
responsible for our own destiny. Id.
141 CASSELL'S FRENcH DICTIONARY 640 (3d ed. 1979).
142 Observatoire des retraites, The French System, available at http://www.observatoire-
retraites.org/versionanglaise/frenchsystem/Introduction.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
143 Indeed, in March 2000, Lionel Jospin, then France's prime minister declared,
"Repartition is the symbol of the chain of solidarity which links the generations. It is one of the
most important terms in the nation's social pact." France Funks Pension Reform, THE
ECONoMIST, March 25, 2000, at 51.
144 Observatoire des Retraites, supra note 142.
145 Id.
146 Francois Wenz-Dumas, Raffarin tourne autour du pot des retraites, LIBItRATION,
available at http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=85960 (Feb. 4, 2003).
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as-you-go social security system! Moreover, it is worth noting that the French
protests can not be lightly ignored. Then-Prime Minister Alain Jupp6's proposed
reform of the special regimes in 1995 failed in large part due to massive
protests. 147
The third lesson to be learned from the debate is that many, if not all, of the
arguments should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism because self-
interest clearly appears to play a role in the debate. On the one hand, the strong
opposition trade unions have to developing the role of savings in retirement
preparation may be attributable, at least in part, to their fear that such a
development risks reducing their power. They are currently co-managers of most
of the pension regimes 148 and fear they would have little or no role in funded
plans. On the other hand, the insurance companies, forceful proponents of
developing supplementary funded regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s are
no less guilty of self-interest. They clearly envisaged themselves a playing a large
role in the management of the newly expanded funded regimes. 149
The final, and perhaps most unfortunate lesson of the French debate, is that it
does not offer a definitive answer to the American privatization debate. Because
the French have not privatized their first tier benefits, their system does not
provide any direct evidence on the advisability of privatizing. France's failed
funded schemes in the early to mid-twentieth century, however, should give
advocates of partial privatization of social security some pause for concern.
14 7 See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
148 Blanchet & Legros, supra note 12, at 110.
149 Id. at 113-14.
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